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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

Also noteworthy is the case of Spectacular Promotions, Inc. v.
Radio Station WING, which contains an excellent analysis of the
situs of an injury for purposes of 302 (a) (3) in an unfair competition action.
The editors of the Law Review would welcome suggestions
from our readers concerning the treatment of topics which would
be of interest to the practicing bar. Since the primary purpose
of the Quarterly Survey is to impart information which will
keep practitioners abreast of New York's procedural law, we
feel that its subject matter should correlate with what attorneys
want to know. And, from what better place can this be divined
than from the attorneys themselves? We look forward, then, to
correspondence with *respect to procedural problems confronting
our readers, and we will try out best to treat them.
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ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION

AND SERvcE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE

OF CoURT

CPLR 302(a) (3): Sufficient contacts further defined.
In McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp.,' plaintiff was
one of several New York distributors for defendant, an Illinois
corporation not doing business in the State.2 When friction developed between plaintiff and certain of its customers, defendant
sent to New York its representative, whose domicile and office were
in New Jersey. The representative made a few visits to New
York in an unsuccessful attempt to ease the friction. On one
of his visits he was accompanied by a manager of the Illinois
corporation.

Upon defendant's termination of the distributorship agreement,
plaintiff brought an action alleging breach of contract and conspiracy, basing jurisdiction on CPLR 302(a) (1) and (2). Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
granted.
Though the plaintiff's affidavits were ambiguous, the trial
court gave "plaintiff the benefit of the doubt" and inferred that
the original distributorship contract was made in New York. Sub120 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967).

2 Defendant had "no place of business here, no officers, agents or
employees, no property either real or personal, and no telephone listing"
in New York. Orders from the New York distributors were made by
mail to Chicago where they were accepted or rejected.
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sequent renewals of the contract took place in Illinois. It was
also found that less than five percent of defendant's sales were
attributable to its New York distributors.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals summarily disposed of plaintiff's 302(a) (2) basis on the authority of Feathers v. McLucas,3
holding that the act complained of, viz., the termination of the
distributorship agreement, occurred in Illinois. 4 Since the action
was commenced prior to the effective date of CPLR 302 (a) (3),
that section was not available in this action. However, the Court
suggested that the defendant's extra-state acts might constitute a
sufficient jurisdictional basis for a later suit by plaintiff under
302(a) (3).
Likewise it was held that plaintiff lacked the remaining jurisdictional predicate alleged-transaction of business by defendant
in New York. After weighing the facts, the Court concluded
that the defendant's business contacts with the State were so
"infinitesimal" that it could not be ordered to defend in New
York.
The majority suggested that "enthusiasm to implement the
reach of the long-arm statute" should not transcend the general
rule that defendants should be subject to suit "where they are
normally found, that is, at their pre-eminent headquarters, or
where they conduct substantial general business activities." 6
The minority found that jurisdiction could be sustained on
the basis of the defendant's negotiations in New York, and its
shipments and sending of representatives into New York. These
contacts, the three dissenting judges determined, gave rise to a
more substantial basis for jurisdiction than those in Kramer v.
Vogl 7 where jurisdiction was denied, and closely approached in
substance the contacts present in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co.
v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., where jurisdiction was sustained.
Prior to the decision in the present case, it had been suggested by one commentator that sending of representatives into
New York would be a sufficient additional contact by a non-resident who ships goods into New York to subject it to long-arm
315

N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).

For a dis-

cussion of the Feathers case, see The Biannual Survey of New York
Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 122 (1965).
4The Court, in passing, noted that the breach of the distributorship
agreement,
debatably might constitute a tort as well as a breach of contract.
5
McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 383, 229 N.E2d
604, 608, 283 N.Y.S.2c_ 34, 38-39 (1967).
Id. at 383, 229 N.E.2d at 607, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
7 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d- 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966)
(mere shipment of goods). See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 279, 292 (1966).
8 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S2d 8 (1965) (purposeful
activity of representatives). See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 122, 133 (1965).
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jurisdiction, since the presence of representatives would evidence
an intent to perform purposeful acts in New York.9 Seemingly,
the Court in McKee has qualified this proposition so that where
the visits of the representative are few and the primary purpose
is to participate in general discussions that fail to accomplish substantial results, there is no purposeful activity in New York sufficient to constitute a transaction of business.
To construe CPLR 302(a)(1) otherwise would, as observed
by the Court of Appeals, create a risk of in personam jurisdiction
as to any corporation "whose officers or sales personnel happen
to pass the time of day with a New York customer in New
York. ..

. "10

CPLR 302(a)(3): Recent Developnwnts.
Under New York's amended long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction may be exercised over non-domiciliaries who commit tortious acts without the state causing injury within the state if
certain criteria are met. ' The original tort provision of the
CPLR, 302 (a) (2), still found in the statute, allowed for personal
jurisdiction to be exercised over non-domiciliaries who committed
tortious acts within the state.' 2
While the Supreme Court of Illinois had interpreted its longarm statute-similar to and a model for the New York act-to
include a tortious act originating outside the state culminating in
injury within the state to be a tortious act committed within the
4
state,13 the New York Court of Appeals, in Feathers v. McLucas,
gave a strict and literal interpretation to CPLR 302(a) (2), stating
that the language of the statute was "too plain and precise" to
0
See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 91 (1966).
1020 N.Y.2d at 382, 229 N.E.2d at 607, 283 N.Y.S2d at 37.

"1That is, the defendant must:
(1) regularly do or solicit business in New York, or
(2) engage in a persistent course of conduct within the state, or
derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered
in New York. CPLR 302(a) (3) (i).
Or the defendant must:
(1) expect or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in New York, and
(2) derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. CPLR 302(a) (3) (ii).
CPLR 302(a) (2).
13Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 23 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
The Ohio manufacturer of a defective valve
which caused injury in Illinois was held to be within the "tortious
act" provision of Illinois' long-arm statute since there could be no distinction between the negligent act of manufacturing and the injury caused
thereby.
14 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See generally
The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHx's L. Rv. 122,
134 (1965).

